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8 APR 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Recommended Publication of Selected Portions
of the Material Contained in the so-called
McNamara Report, "The Roles of Airstrikes in
Attaining U.S. Objectives in North Vietnam"

1. As you know, by order of the Director of Central Intelligence, the referenced report has been made available only to Secretary McNamara and to selected recipients within this Agency. We do not question Director Fahn's judgment on the sensitivity of the report and are not seeking to give it broad distribution in its present form.

2. However, the report embodies many man-hours of careful research which we believe can be completely divorced from the sensitive portions (primary recommendations), and made available throughout the intelligence community. I am therefore submitting for your consideration a series of steps whereby the research data in the report could be published independently of the sensitive material.

3. The summary of the report would not be disseminated but material in the appendixes would either be published as separate reports or incorporated with other material in the following sequence:

a. The immediate publication in a single report, after making the necessary modifications to delete any references to recommendations, of the present Appendix B, "The Rolling Thunder Attack," and Appendix C, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the Bombing of North Vietnam." This report would put under one cover an operations analysis of the actual air operations carried out in the Rolling Thunder program through 1965 and our estimates of the economic and military damage resulting from these attacks. We believe such a report would be a basic reference work for analysts in the intelligence community dealing with the problem of air strikes against North Vietnam.

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b. The immediate publication of Appendix E, "The Effectiveness of Air Attacks in Other Wars." This report is essentially an abbreviated historical analysis focusing on the interdiction efforts against Germany and Japan in World War II and more particularly on similar operations during the Korean War. We believe this summary volume would be a valuable reference work for the intelligence community.

c. We propose to incorporate a good deal of the material now in Appendix A, "The Logistic Supply of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam" in a somewhat broader publication that would be issued late in May. The new logistic and requirements study would include the results of the research we now have under way as our contribution to the forthcoming NIE 14.3-66, "North Vietnamese Military Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam." The title of this NIE is somewhat misleading since its primary focus is on supply and logistic problems. While we have published many abbreviated papers on these subjects, we believe there is a need for a thoroughgoing analysis which would also provide an independent estimate of requirements necessary to support the insurgency in the South.

d. Finally, in late June we have scheduled a publication on North Vietnam which will cover its current functioning as a war supporting mechanism and its potential for so doing. One part of this report would be an analysis of individual industries in North Vietnam, including their dependence on outside supply and their contribution to the insurgency in the South and to the military defense of North Vietnam. We would propose to incorporate pertinent material now in Appendix D of the McNamara report entitled "Potential of Air Attacks as a Weapon to Achieve Rolling Thunder Objectives." The target system references would, of course, be deleted.

4. We request your approval of the course of action proposed in paragraph 3, above, because we believe that it would make a positive contribution both to the intelligence community and to the policy-making level of the Government. It would also provide a more complete return on the very large investment needed to produce the basic report.

WILLIAM W. MORELL, JR.
Director
Research and Reports

Attachments:
As Stated

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